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In the wake of litigation that has provided no assistance in
understanding the limits and scope of secondary liability, this paper
explores secondary liability's origin in copyright law, comments on its
practical application and argues for legislation. Recent cases involving
secondary liability for intellectual property infringement have resulted in
uncertainty and chaos.' The Supreme Court's decision in MGM Studios
v. Grokster, Limited.2 ("Grokster") established a climate of judicial
expansion of statutory liability for intellectual property infringement.
The Supreme Court's introduction of yet another theory of secondary
" Professor Powell is an Assistant Professor of Law at Baylor University School of Law. She earned
a BA in Biology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a Juris Doctorate from
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., et al., 464 U.S. 417, 435
(1984); MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 545 U.S. 913, 921 (2005); A&M Records,
Inc. et al. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334
F.3d 643, 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
2. MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005).
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liability for copyright infringement, "inducement", in Grokster opened
the floodgates for intellectual property owners to file infringement
actions, which attempt to stretch the limits of the notion of secondary
liability.3 This article begins by outlining the development of secondary
liability theory for copyrights, followed by a discussion highlighting the
overly-active role the judiciary has played in its development, and closes
with addressing the future of secondary liability for copyrights based on
its potential application in current litigation.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY LIABILITY THEORY FOR COPYRIGHT
Secondary liability for copyright infringement represents a
judicially crafted extension of traditional notions of copyright liability.
The Copyright Act does not contain explicit language4 that allows for
third-party liability based upon the infringing acts of another.5 However,
using principles of common law,6 courts have found third-parties
vicariously and contributorily liable for the direct infringements of
others. Most recently, the Supreme Court has found liability for the
active inducement of infringement of copyrights.7 The Supreme Court
has stated emphatically that in the absence of express language a statute
does not preclude the imposition of liability on parties who have not
themselves engaged in infringing activities because common law
principles such as vicarious liability and contributory infringement have
been imposed in virtually all areas of the law.' This section outlines the
evolution of secondary liability in copyright law and comments on the
judiciary's willingness to expand copyright liability.
3. Id at 932-34
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2008) (Unlike the Patent Act which expressly provides for
secondary liability, the notions of secondary liability for copyrights and trademarks are judicially
crafted.)
5. Id.; 15 U.S.C §1051 (2008).
6. See generally Richter v. Van Amberg, 97 F.Supp. 2d 1255 (D.N.M. 2000); BBS Norwalk
One, Inc. v. Raccolta Inc., 60 F.Supp 2d 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Fromer v. Yogel, 50 F.Supp. 2d 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Aetna Cas. & Stir. Co. v. Leahey Constr. Co., Inc., 22 F.Supp 2d 695 (N.D.Ohio
1988).
7. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935; A&M Records, Inc., et al. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
1020-1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
8. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., et al., 464 U.S. 417,435 (1984).
[3:189
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A. Early Developments
Secondary liability for copyright infringement dates back to 1911. 9
In Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers, a case decided under the
Copyright Act of 1909, The Kalem Company employed an individual to
read the book Ben Hur and then to write a screen play that would be
marketed and sold to jobbers who would produce a motion picture.'0
The Supreme Court found the Kalem Company liable for both the
unauthorized dramatization of the book Ben Hur and for the sale of the
motion picture." Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, opined:
In some cases where an ordinary article of commerce is sold
nice questions may arise as to the point at which the seller
becomes an accomplice in a subsequent illegal use by the
buyer. It has been held that mere indifferent supposition or
knowledge on the part of the seller that the
buyer.. .contemplating such unlawful use is not enough to
connect him with the possible unlawful consequences.. .but no
such niceties are involved here. The defendant not only
expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films for
dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most
conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the
only one for which especially they were made. If the
defendant did not contribute to the infringement, it is
impossible to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is
liable on principles recognized in every part of the law.'
2
This decision marked the beginning of the development of a body
of law that established liability for those that contribute to the
infringement of Copyrights. These cases further established that a
supplier of the means to infringe that has sufficient knowledge of said
infringement (or turns a blind eye) or is in a position to control the use of
copyrighted works by others and authorizes the use without permission
from owner of the copyright can be held liable for infringement. 13 The
concept of secondary liability can be found in legislative history of the
9. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55,63 (1911).
10. Id.at6O-61.
11. Id. at 60.
12. Id. at 62-63
13. See generally Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d (2d Cir. 1963);
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971); Famous
Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n., Inc., 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir.
1977); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996); KECA Music, Inc. v.
Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F.Supp. 72 (W.D Mo. 1977).
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Copyright Act of 1976.14 Congress did not explicitly provide language
in the Copyright Act of 1976; however, the legislative history suggests
that it was the intent of Congress to recognize secondary liability in the
Copyright Act by providing copyright owners the exclusive right to
"authorize" the rights enumerated by the Act of 1976."5 While Congress
did not specify the details of secondary liability, Congress explained
"use of the phrase authorized is intended to avoid any question as to the
liability of contributory infringers."
16
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios'7 ("Sony")
provided the Supreme Court the first opportunity to interpret and apply
the 1976 Act18 with respect to secondary liability. Sony involved the
distribution by Sony of its Video Tape Recorder (VTR), the Betamax,
which enabled users to record copyrighted television programming.' 9
The purchaser of the Betamax could use the VTR for noninfiinging
purposes such as recording for viewing at a later time (this use is
referred to as "time-shifting"), or the purchaser could use the VTR for
infringing purposes such as building libraries of copyrighted programs.2 °
The question presented to the Court in Sony was whether the
manufacturer and distributor of the Betamax VTR could be held liable
under the doctrine of contributory liability for the infringing actions of
the end users of the VTR.21 The Court, while recognizing that secondary
liability is a fundamental part of copyright law, acknowledged that the
facts of Sony were vastly different from the previous cases that found
secondary liability.22  The Sony Court noted that Sony only had
constructive knowledge of the fact that the end users of the product may
infringe copyright.23 The Sony Court looked to patent law, specifically
the doctrine of the "staple article of commerce ' 24 to provide guidance on
how to resolve the issue in Sony.25 The "staple article of commerce"
doctrine provides that "a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not subject to contributory
14. H.R. Rep 94-1476, at 61 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101-810 (2008).
19. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420
20. Id. at 420.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 437-38.
23. Id. at 439.
24. Id. at 440.
25. Id.
[3:189
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infringement because patent rights should not extend to control the sale
of staple articles in commerce.26 The Court applying this rationale to
copyrights explained that "[t]he staple article of commerce doctrine must
strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for
effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly,
and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas
of commerce." 7
Sony placed restrictions on the general rule of applicability of
contributory liability copyright law.28 The Court explained that "[t]he
sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be
capable of substantial noninfringing uses." 29
Thus, Sony established a safe harbor for the distributors of
technology that enables copying if such technology is "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. 30  The safe harbor established under
Sony has been the topic of much debate in the legal disputes involving
peer-to-peer services 31 like Napster and successors such as Aimster,
Morpheus, Kazaa and Grokster. The courts have struggled with
applying Sony to peer-to-peer file sharing networks.32 This struggle led
to a split between the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit courts as to
how Sony should be applied to peer-to-peer file sharing networks.33
B. Circuit Court Split Regarding Application of Secondary Liability
The Ninth Circuit had the first opportunity to apply Sony in
copyright litigation involving the peer-to-peer service Napster.34
Napster operated as a typical peer-to-peer network with one addition;
35
Napster maintained a centralized server that indexed all the files shared
26. Id.
27. Id. at 442.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Peer-to-peer file transferring refers to networks that allow users to connect with other
users in the same network in order to transfer files electronically. Users connect to the networking
using specific software such as Napster, Grokster, LimeWire, Aimster, and Morpheus. In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 645-647 (7th Cir. 2003).
32. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
33. See generally id.; In re Ainster, 334 F.3d at 649-50.
34. Napster,239F.3dat 1011.
35. Id. at 1012.
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on its network.36 The Ninth Circuit found that Napster met the
requirements of contributory infringement and vicarious liability.37 As
to the contributory infringement claim, 38 the court found that Napster
had actual knowledge of the infringing activity made possible on its
network and that the software and services Napster provided were the
"material contribution" necessary for the infringement. 39 As to vicarious
liability,40 the court found that Napster enjoyed a financial benefit from
the infringement because its revenues were generated directly from
advertisements placed on its services.4' Moreover, the court concluded
that Napster's software design and services provided it with the ability to
block access to users who were direct infringers.42 The Ninth Circuit
discussed Sony in Napster, finding that Sony only applied to contributory
infringement.43 The court stated that Sony was of "limited assistance to
Napster" because Napster had "actual specific knowledge of the direct
infringements" that occurred on its network.44  The Ninth Circuit
viewed Sony applicable only when knowledge of infringement was
being imputed to the developer of the technology.
45
The next circuit to address Sony and its application to peer-to-peer
networks was the Seventh Circuit in In re Aimster ("Aimster"). 46
Aimster operated in conjunction with AOL's Instant Messenger.47 When
users logged on to AOL to chat they were also capable of sharing files
that had been designated in their shared files folder.48 The transmissions
between Aimster's users were encrypted such that the developer of the
peer-to-peer service did not have any idea of the files that were being
shared.4 9 The Aimster court only addressed contributory infringement.50
36. Id. at 1011-1012.
37. Id. at 1027.
38. The court held that contributory infringement required the secondary infringer to have 1)
knowledge and 2) materially contribute to the infringement. Id. at 1019.
39. Id. at 1022.
40. The court held that vicarious liability required 1) financial benefit and 2) supervision. Id.
at 1023.
41. Id. at 1023. Napster's business model provided an incentive for Napster to encourage its
users to infringe. The more users, the more advertising, the more money.
42. Id. at 1023.
43. Id. at 1022.
44. Id. at 1020.
45. Id.
46. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 648-50 (7th Cir. 2003).
47. Not only was Aimster troubled with copyright issues, Aimster had trademark problems
and subsequently had to change its name. Id. at 646.
48. Id.
49. The implementation of encryption to the Aimster service was a direct response to the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Napster, in which the court stated that Sony provide no assistance
[3:189
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The court held Aimster liable for contributory infringement by finding
sufficient evidence that it had actual knowledge of the infringement
conducted on its network.5' Moreover, the court found that the
encrypted transmissions did not save Aimster from liability, as willful
blindness, constitutes knowledge in the law.52
After finding sufficient knowledge to establish contributory
infringement, the court extensively addressed Sony. 53  Judge Posner
writing for the court refused to grant the Sony safe harbor to Aimster.
54
Posner, found that Aimster offered no evidence to support its claim that
the software was capable of noninfringing uses and concluded that it is
not sufficient to show that "a product or service be capable . . . of a
noninfinging use."55 Ultimately, Posner interpreted Sony as requiring:
(1) substantial noninfringing uses, and (2) evidence that it would be
disproportionately costly to eliminate or at least substantially reduced
the infringing uses.56
The Ninth Circuit had another opportunity to address Sony in
Grokster.5  The Ninth Circuit's decision in Grokster highlighted the
differences in interpretation of Sony as applied to peer-to-peer
technology between the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit.58 In
contrast to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Napster and the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Aimster, the Ninth Circuit found that Grokster was
not liable for contributory infringement. 59  The Ninth Circuit
established a burden shifting approach to determine liability. 60 The
court held that "if substantial non-infringing use was shown, the
copyright owner would be required to show that the defendants had
reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files.6 1 The Grokster court
because it only addressed technology where the developer had no knowledge of the infringing
activities. Id.
50. Id. at 647.
51. The court noted that Aimster's software provided a tutorial that highlighted how transfer
copyrighted music. Moreover, the existence of an additional premium "Aimster club" which
allowed users to pay a monthly fee for quick access to downloading popular music, work which was
more than likely to be copyrighted, provided evidence of encouraging infringing use. Id. at 646.
52. Id. at 650.
53. Id. at 651.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 653.
56. Id. at 653.
57. MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated,
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
58. See generally id.
59. Id. at 1162.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1161.
2009]
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focused on the differences in the technology between the Grokster and
the Napster software. 62 The court concluded that Grokster's software
was more akin to a staple article of commerce. 63 The court reasoned that
Grokster had no continued relation to the user once the software was
downloaded.64 This fact was extremely important because while the
appellees in Grokster had actual knowledge of the infringing acts
occurring across its networks based upon the notices provided by the
appellants, the court found that specific knowledge of infringement at
the precise moment when appellees had the ability to limit the
infringement was necessary to establish contributory infringement.
65
The court held that the knowledge required under Sony was not found in
Grokster.66 Relying on Sony, the court found that once the software was
downloaded, there was no ability to control or limit the infringing
activity of the end users. 67 Therefore, the court concluded, that any
notice served to Grokster by appellants after the software was
downloaded was irrelevant.
68
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that there was evidence that
Grokster was capable of noninfringing uses.69 Grokster enumerated
several types of files traded using its software that were in fact
noninfringing. These files included copies of music by artists such as
Wilco, Pearl Jam, Dave Matthews and John Mayer that authorized file
sharing70; free electronic books and other works from various online
publishers, including Project Gutenberg71; public domain and authorized
software, such as WinZip72; and music videos and televisions and movie
segments distributed with the permission of the copyright holders.73
While the quantities of the above-listed files available on Grokster
were not detailed, the appellants' expert noted that 75% of the files that
were available on Grokster were infringing and 15% were "likely
infringing" , thus leaving 10% percent of which can be presumed to
62. Id. at 1161-64.
63. Seeid. at l167.
64. Id. at 1163-64.
65. Id. at 1161-63.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1165.
68. Id.
69. MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 545 U.S. 913, 952 (2005).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 953.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 952.
[3:189
8
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/7
THE SAGA CONTINUES
include those listed as noninfringing by Grokster. 75 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that in light of the evidence presented by Grokster and the
appellants; and its review of the evidence in Sony, which cited a similar
figure for time-shifting; and with 9% of use deemed noninfringing,
Grokster met the requirements of the Sony safe harbor.
76
C. Supreme Court's Take On Contributory Liability
After receiving the major loss in the Ninth Circuit, the appellants
petitioned the Supreme Court's review of the case in Grokster based
upon the differences in the interpretation of Sony by the Ninth and
Seventh Circuits. The question presented was as follows: "[u]nder what
circumstances the distributor of a product capable of both lawful and
unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties
[sic] ."77
The Supreme Court's review of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Grokster attempted to balance the interest of intellectual property rights
holders and technology developers. 78 The Court noted that "the subject
of [the] case" was the conflict between the two principles of copyright
law: "supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and
promoting innovation in new communication technologies by limiting
the incidence of liability for copyright infringement."'79 While the Court
was somewhat fractured in its opinion regarding the application of Sony,
the Court unanimously upheld the ruling in Sony. The Court
explained:
We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching
on regular commerce or discouraging the development of
technologies with lawful and unlawful potential.
Accordingly, just as Sony did not find intentional inducement
despite the knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that its
device could be used to infringe . . . mere knowledge of
infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be
enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would
ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at918.
78. Id. at 930.
79. Id. at 928.
80. Id. at 937.
20091
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customers technical support or product update, support
liability in themselves.
8 1
The Court, in its opinion, however, did not clarify the long-standing
confusion with respect to Sony's application to new technology-
specifically the criteria necessary to qualify for the Sony "safe harbor."
82
This issue was addressed in the two concurring opinions authored by
83 84Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer
Justice Ginsburg notes prominently at the beginning of her opinion
that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit misperceived and
misapplied the Court's holding in Sony.85  Justice Ginsburg found the
evidence submitted by Grokster in support of a Sony safe harbor
unpersuasive, characterizing it as "little beyond anecdotal." 86 Justice
Ginsburg argued that the evidence submitted on behalf of Grokster could
not support a motion for summary judgment.87 This argument is
seemingly one of procedure, which concludes that the Ninth Circuit
erred in granting summary judgment.88  Justice Ginsburg, notes that
"[i]n Sony, the Court considered Sony's liability for selling the Betamax
video cassette recorder.. .enlightened by a full trial record." 89  Justice
Ginsburg endeavors to explain why the evidence submitted by Grokster
could not support a grant of summary judgment.90  First, Justice
Ginsburg explains that the Ninth Circuit applied a burden shifting test
that was established in Napster.9 1  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found
that if there is a showing of substantial noninfringing uses of the
81. Id.at937.
82. Brief for Grokster, Ltd. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, MGM v. Grokster
Ltd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). The briefs submitted by amici in Grokster proposed five basic
interpretations of Sony: (1) Plain Language-if there exists a reasonable possibility that there will
be substantial current or future use of a technology for noninfringing activities, the provider of the
technology is not liable; (2)Primary Use-the Sony safe harbor only applies if lawful uses
predominate; (3) Aimster-liability attaches if there are substantial infringing uses and the
developer of the technology fails to implement technology that is not disproportionately costly to
prevent infringement; (4)Willful Blindness--the Sony safe harbor should not be available if the
developer of the technology was willfully blind to the infringing activity; and (5) Sliding Scale--
Sony would be available depending upon the amount of infringement.
83. Justices Renquist and Kennedy joined the concurrence of Justice Ginsburg. MGM v.
Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005).
84. Justice O'Connor joined the concurrence of Justice Bryer. Id. at 949.
85. Id. at 942.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 941-49.
89. Id. at 942.
90. Id. at 943-44.
91. Id. at 944.
[3:189
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technology, then the burden would shift to the copyright holder to
establish that the developer of the technology had reasonable knowledge
of specific infringing files.92 Justice Ginsburg notes that the evidence
reviewed by the Ninth Circuit was that of the musical band Wilco, which
in making one of its albums available for download, authorized free
distribution of their music and to public domain literary works and films
available through Groskter's software- and further comments that
Grokster "differs markedly from Sony". 3 Justice Ginsburg argues that
unlike Sony, there was no finding by a court of uses that could be
classified as fair use and there is nothing more than anecdotal evidence
of noninfringing uses.94 In fact, Justice Ginsburg comments, both the
District Court and the Ninth Circuit relied on declarations submitted by
Grokster, many of which, Justice Ginsburg notes, could be classified as
hearsay. Notwithstanding, Justice Ginsburg concluded that even if the
noninfringing files shared on Grokster were large, it does not follow that
the product is put to substantial noninfringing uses particularly when
there was evidence that Grokster's software was used overwhelmingly to
infringe.96  Because there were no findings in this case, Justice
Ginsburg concluded that the evidence proffered was "insufficient to
demonstrate, beyond genuine debate, a reasonable prospect that
substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses were likely to
develop over time."
97
Justice Breyer, to the contrary, argues that the conclusion reached
by the Ninth Circuit in Grokster has adequate legal support in view of
the evidence in the record and the Court's opinion in Sony.98 Justice
Breyer first begins by reviewing the Sony standard. Justice Breyer
writes:
...[T]he court recognized the need for the law, in
fixing secondary copyright liability, to "strike a balance
between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for
effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory
monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in
substantially unrelated areas of commerce." (citation omitted).
92. MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
93. Id at 945 (Ginsburg, R., concurring).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 948.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 949.
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It pointed to patent law's "staple article of commerce"
doctrine, under which a distributor of a product is not liable
for patent infringement by its customers unless that product is
"unsuited for any commercial noninffinging use." (citation
omitted) The court wrote that the sale of copying equipment,
"like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need
merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.99
In Sony, Justice Breyer writes, "[t]he Court ultimately characterized
the legal 'question'...as 'whether Sony's VCR is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses' (while declining to give
'precise content' to these terms)." oo When applying this standard,
Justice Breyer notes that the Court in Sony had before it evidence that
only 9% of the total uses of the VTR was authorized.'10  The Court in
Sony, in addition to the survey commissioned by the District Court,
reviewed testimony from officials of professional sports leagues and
religious broadcasting organization to support its findings. 102 While the
record in Grokster was composed of affidavits and or declarations
Justice Breyer nevertheless argues that Grokster passes the Sony test. 103
Specifically, Justice Breyer opines that to meet the standard, Grokster's
product needs to be capable of substantial or commercially significant
noninfringing uses. 104  Justice Breyer buttresses his position that
Grokster has meet the standard established in Sony by comparing the
record in Grokster to the record in Sony. 105 Justice Breyer points to
MGM's expert declaration which indicated some 10% of files shared
using Grokster were noninfringing, a figure that Justice Breyer labels
"very similar" to the percentage of authorized copying in Sony. 106
Justice Breyer's review of declarations submitted in Grokster and the
testimony of record in Sony confirms the position that one can
reasonably infer lawful uses analogous to those at issue in Sony.
107
99. Id. at 950.
100. Id. at 950.
101. Id. at 951.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 952.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 952-53.
106. Id. at 952.
107. Id. at 952-53.
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Further, Justice Breyer notes that MGM did not put forth any evidence
"sufficient to survive judgment."' 10 8
Finally, Justice Breyer comments that the real question at issue is
not whether Grokster satisfied the standard set forth by the Court in
Sony. Indeed, Justice Breyer opines that Grokster has, but rather is
whether the standard in Sony needs to be modified or more strictly
interpreted as advocated by Justice Ginsburg. 10 9 Justice Breyer answers
these questions in the negative, commenting that the rule in Sony as he
interprets it provides technology developers the needed protections for
the introduction of new technology without being subjected to massive
copyright liability and that a more strict interpretation would undercut
the protections Sony provides to technology developers."l
0
The two concurring opinions provide some insight into the minds
of the Court with respect to the question that was actually presented in
Grokster. Justice Ginsburg argues that summary judgment was
inappropriate because of the lack of testimony or any trial court findings
and calls for a denial of summary judgment.'1 ' Justice Breyer however,
conducts a comparison of the evidentiary records of both Sony and
Grokster to determine that indeed, the Ninth Circuit's decision with
respect to Grokster was grounded legally. 112  Notwithstanding the
concurring opinions regarding the limitations of contributory liability
and the application of the Sony safe harbor, the Court did not review
Sony, and a unanimous opinion of the Court found Grokster liable to the
copyright holders.
113
D. Supreme Court's Take On Secondary Liability
Rather than provide any clarity on the limits of contributory
liability, the Court in Grokster announced a new theory of liability-
108. Id. at 953.
109. Id. at 955.
110. Id.at955-56.
111. It is important to note that Justice Ginsburg does not make any conclusion as to whether if
there is a trial, that there could be a showing sufficient to satisfy Sony, but simply contends that
summary judgment was not appropriate for this case. Id. at 942.
112. It should be noted that Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, in combination with the
opinion of the Court, provides a comprehensive answer to the question actually presented. The
concurring opinion first resolves the split in the circuits, holding that a technology need only be
capable of significant or substantial noninfiinging uses to avoid liability for contributory liability.
Second, the opinion of the Court provides the basis for another form of liability that can be found
even in the absence of contributory liability to which the Sony safe harbor is not applicable. Id. at
950-66.
113. See id.
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inducement, which it described as "[o]ne who distributes a device with
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement is
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."
' 14
The Court concluded that Sony does not require courts to ignore
other theories of law under which the developer of a technology may be
liable."' The Court rationalized that the behavior of the developers of
the Grokster software could not escape a finding of liability based upon
their active inducement of users to infringe copyrights." 6  The new
"inducement" theory of liability seeks to separate the technology from
the behavior of the developers." 7  As the Court explained, "[t]he
inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable
expression and conduct."' 18  This delineation is artificial at best and is
arguably an intentional diversion by the Supreme Court of the issue
regarding the split in the circuit courts of the meaning of Sony. l9 The
conflicting concurring opinions in Grokster, indicate that, like lawyers
and intellectual property scholars, the Supreme Court itself is unsure of
the application of Sony.'20  Never reaching the ultimate question
presented, the Court, like in Sony, borrowed the theory of inducement
from the Patent Act, declaring that theory to be a "sensible one for
copyright."'
121
E. Current State of Affairs of Secondary Liability
So what is the inducement rule? The Court in Grokster did not
articulate a set of factors for application to subsequent cases, but rather
looked at the specific facts presented in Grokster.122 The Court in
Grokster found that the "unlawful objective [was] unmistakable"'123 from
114. Id. at914.
115. Id. at 914-916.
116. Id. at 915.
117. See generally id. The Court noted that there was overlap in the contributory liability and
inducement; however, "they captured different culpable behavior."
118. Id. at937.
119. The Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit have profound differences in determining when the
safe harbor of Sony applies to developers of technology. The Seventh Circuit in Aimster applied a
primary purpose rule, whereas the Ninth Circuit in Grokster applied the precise language of Sony,
requiring mere capability of non-infringing use. Compare In re Aimster Copyright Litig.,334 F.3d
643 (7th Cir. 2003) with MGM Studios, Inc., et. al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160
(9th Cir. 2004).
120. See generally MGM Studios Inc., et al, v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
121. Id. at 936.
122. Id. at934-941.
123. Id. at939.
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the record before it. In so finding, the Court's analysis provided
minimal guidance on what might be considered inducement. 124 Because
the analysis was so fact-specific, one can only deduce that inducement
will be found if the developer of technology: (1) developed the
technology with the intent that it be used to infringe; (2) aimed the
technology towards known infringers; and (3) received a financial
benefit from the infringing activities. 25 These factors coincide with the
Court's dichotomy between the technology itself and the behavior of the
developers. 126 The Court however, looked to the technology to impute
behavior. 27  Indeed, the Court found three characteristics of the
technology notable-the software's compatibility with Napster, the
software's capability of directing advertisements to its users and the
failure to design or implement technology that would prevent improper
use of its software.
128
The Court in Grokster seemingly placed some limitations on the
inducement rule. 129  The Court stated that there must be affirmative
evidence of culpable intent and one cannot impute such intent to the
developer of the technology by virtue of the uses of the product. 3° Nor
can the failure to incorporate devices which restricts infringement
standing alone be sufficient to establish inducement.'13  In addition, the
Court explained that the remedies for inducement should be tailored
appropriately to avoid interfering with the distribution of technology in
the marketplace.
1 32
II. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AT ITS FINEST
Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution provides "[t]he Congress
shall have Power ... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful
124. See generally id. at 934-41.
125. Grokster used digital codes in their website related to Napster, in an effort to capture the
Napster market when Napster received an unfavorable court ruling. StreamCast developed software
called OpenNap, which allowed Napster users to connect to StreamCast's network. Both Grokster
and StreamCast derived revenues from advertisements, thereby providing them an incentive to
encourage greater user activity.
126. Id. at936.
127. Id. at 934-41.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 936.
130. Id. at 934.
131. Id. at936-37.
132. Id.
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Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writing and Discoveries.' 33
The text of the Constitution is clear. It is Congress that has been
delegated the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly granted
to artists and inventors. 34 It is important to note that from its inception,
the Copyright Act has developed in response to changes in
technology. 31 Indeed, before the enactment of the Copyright Act of
1909,136 it was settled that only Congress could fashion remedies for
copyright. 37 In Sony, the Court stated that "[s]ound policy, as well as
history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major
technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to
accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that
are inevitably implicated by such new technology.'
' 38
To the contrary, the Supreme Court in Grokster did not exercise the
type of judicial restraint exercised by the Sony Court. 3 9 The Grokster
Court, in fact did not rule on the questions that were presented before the
Court.'4 The Court fashioned its opinion based upon the "bad acts" of
the developer. 14' But, how does this Court escape the facts of Sony? 42
As stated in the Respondents' brief in Sony:
[P]etitioners' advertisements, brochures and instruction
manuals unquestionably cause, urge, encourage and aid VTR
purchasers to infringe respondents' copyrights, petitioners are
liable by analogy to [patent law] notwithstanding their claim
that VTRs are staple articles of commerce.
[P]etitioners' advertisements "exhort" Betamax
purchasers to record "favorite shows," "movies," ".classic
133. U.S. CONST. art. , § 8.
134. See generally Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (1834); Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123
(1889).
135. See generally White-Smith Music Publ. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (Copyright Act
of 1909); Fortnightly Corp., v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Teleprompter Corp.
v. Columbia Broad. Sys, 415 U.S. 394 (1974); E. Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, 691 F.2d
125 (2nd Cir. 1982).
136. Priv. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
137. See generally Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (1834); Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123
(1889).
138. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,431 (1984).
139. See generally Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
140. See generally MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
141. See id. at 934-941.
142. Sony, 464 U.S. at 421-25.
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movies" and "novels for television" and to "build a
library."'
143
With the overwhelming factual similarities between Sony and
Grokster'44 upon which the Grokster Court finds the basis of its ruling,
the Sony Court could have easily imported the inducement doctrine to
find Sony liable. However, the Sony Court most judiciously and
cautiously limited the scope of a common-law doctrine that as applied
would have expanded the copyright grant well beyond the reach that was
intended by Congress. 1
45
It is important to note the distinction between how the Court in
Sony used the Patent Act to justify its ruling versus how the Court in
Grokster used the Patent Act to justify its ruling.146  The Court in
Grokster abandoned long-standing canons of using analogous statutes to
limit the scope of common law doctrines. The Court in Grokster looked
to the Patent Act to expand the scope of the Copyright Act. In fact, the
Court's ruling in Grokster is a direct circumvention of the role of
Congress to determine the scope of the monopoly for copyrights by the
Constitution. 147 The history of the Copyright Act, and the development
of technology that enables copying, clearly shows that when a
technology has been introduced that challenges the rights granted under
the Copyright Act, Congress has acted. 48  Indeed, Congress has
continued to draft and implement legislation that is a response to
technology development. 49  In 1998, Congress passed the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")15 0 which responded to a line of
cases in which courts were split on whether internet service providers
(ISPs) were liable for the copyright infringements conducted on the
ISP's systems.' 51 In so doing, Congress created a safe harbor for ISPs
and made criminal the production and dissemination of technology,
143. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 70, 79, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464
U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 81-1687).
144. See supra note 14.
145. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
146. See generally id.; MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd. et al., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
147. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 948..
148. See MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cit. 2004),
vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
150. Id.
151. See generally Playboy Enter. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp 1552 (C.D. Flo. 1993) (ISP found
liable for copyright infringement after a subscriber uploaded infringing materials using the ISP's
system); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Comm'n Servs. Inc., 907 F. Supp 1361 (N.D. Ca.
1995) (finding ISP to be a mere passive conduit for content).
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devices or other services intended to circumvent measures that control
access to copyrighted works.
152
However, the Grokster Court overlooked the DMCA, a specific act
of Congress as well as pending legislation-Senate Bill S. 2560, the
Intentional Inducement of Copyright Infringements Act of 2004,'153 to
find that the rule articulated in Sony did not displace other theories of
secondary liability, including inducement of infringement.
54
Ill. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTION
The practical application of secondary liability for copyright
infringement ultimately turns on two questions: (1) what does Sony
mean and (2) what behavior is culpable under the inducement rule. 155
The Court in Grokster left both of these questions unanswered. 156 Arista
Records LLC, et al. v. LimeWire ("Lime Wire"), 57 is among the first
cases that will apply the holding in Grokster to the developers of
technology.18  While there was an attempt in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa
International Service Association'59 to test the limits of Grokster, the
152. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
153. Intentional Inducement of Copyright Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). The text
of the proposed legislation is as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004'.
SEC. 2. INTENTIONAL INDUCEMENT OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.
Section 501 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
(g)(l) In this subsection, the term 'intentionally induces' means intentionally aids, abets,
induces, or procures, and intent may be shown by acts from which a reasonable person would find
intent to induce infringement based upon all relevant information about such acts then reasonably
available to the actor, including whether the activity relies on infringement for its commercial
viability.
(2) Whoever intentionally induces any violation identified in subsection (a) shall be liable
as an infringer.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall enlarge or diminish the doctrines of vicarious and
contributory liability for copyright infringement or require any court to unjustly withhold or impose
any secondary liability for copyright infringement.'.
154. See generally MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
155. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
156. See generally Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913.
157. Arista Records LLC, et al. v. LimeWire, No. 06-CV. 5936 (S.D.N.Y. filed August 4,
2006).
158. See generally Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913.
159. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
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case was easily dismissed for failure to have the appropriate nexus
between the technology and the ongoing copyright infringement.
60
The LimeWire case will certainly test the application of Sony and
Grokster.161 In the recording industry's motion for summary judgment,
the industry alleges that:
LimeWire has aggressively targeted the known infringing
userbases of Napster, Grokster, Morpheus and Kazaa . . .
Lime Wire's business model depends on massive infringing
use of the LimeWire client . . . Lime Wire has failed to
undertake genuine efforts to filter copyrighted materials from
users' downloads or otherwise reduce infringement . . . Lime
Wire ensured that its technology had infringing capabilities..
. and LimeWire assisted and did not discourage infringement
by LimeWire's users.162
While there are no easily discernable differences between the
technology and uses of the LimeWire software from that of Grokster,
LimeWire rests its entire case on being able to differentiate the facts of
its case from the facts that allowed to the finding of inducement in
Grokster.163 The following facts are most notable:
1. LimeWire did not create a program like OpenNap with the
intent to capture the Napster market, like the defendants in
Grokster. 164
2. LimeWire made efforts to work with the plaintiff's in order
to reduce infringement; however, such efforts were futile
based on lack of cooperation by the plaintiffs.
165
160. The Ninth Circuit held that credit card companies were not contributory or vicariously
liable for infringement of users of their credit cards. Specifically, the court held the link was far too
attenuated to place liability on credit card companies for infringement by their customers. See
generally id.
161. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984);
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913.
162. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 9,
Arista Records LLC, et al. v. LimeWire, No. 06-CV. 5936 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 18, 2008).
163. See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Response In Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Arista Records LLC, et al. v. LimeWire, No. 06-
CV. 5936 (S.D.N.Y. filed September 26, 2008); MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al.,
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
164. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
17, Arista Records LLC, et al. v. LimeWire, No. 06-CV. 5936 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 18, 2008).
165. Id. at 30.
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3. LimeWire created a filtering devise which does attempt to
prevent copyright infringement.'66
4. LimeWire's business model does not depend upon massive
infringement. LimeWire's revenues are mostly obtained by
the sale of its LimeWire Pro software.
167
5. LimeWire requires users who download the software to
agree to comply with copyright laws.
168
The factors highlighted by the Court in Grokster to determine when
a developer can be held liable for inducement to infringe copyrights are
simply not found in LimeWire. 69 The Court in Grokster looked to three
elements probative of intent: (1) whether the technology was developed
with the intent that it be used to infringe, (2) whether the developer
aimed the technology towards known infringers and (3) whether the
developer received a financial benefit from the infringing activities
conducted with its technology.' 70 As noted in the facts above, the three
elements enunciated are not easily demonstrated in the facts of
LimeWire.' 71 Indeed, the Court's discussion regarding failure of the
software developer to implement technology that would prevent
infringement falls short in LimeWire.' 72 LimeWire attempted to work
with the music recording industry to design a tool to balance the interests
of both the music industry and the technology developer. 173 However,
the music industry chose not to cooperate with LimeWire 74
Notwithstanding the lack of cooperation by the music industry,
LimeWire nevertheless implemented a tool that, while not perfect,
attempts to filter out copyrighted material. 7
5
While the facts of LimeWire with respect to the usage of the
technology and the technology itself is undeniably similar to Grokster,
the facts in LimeWire simply do not fit the adage "if it walks like a duck,
166. Id. at31.
167. Id. at 25.
168. Id. at 36-37.
169. See generally id.
170. MGM Studios Inc., etal. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 545 U.S. 913, 934-41 (2005).
171. Arista Records LLC, et al., v. LimeWire, No. 06-CV. 5936 (S.D.N.Y. filed August 4,
2006).
172. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 939.
173. See id. at 936-37.
174. Id.
175. See MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
[3:189
20
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol3/iss1/7
quacks like a duck, it is a duck" or in Supreme Court parlance, "I know
it when I see it" test.1 76  LimeWire is more accurately classified as "it
has feathers, lives by the pond, but doesn't quite quack" or "I think I
might recognize it but I am not so sure. 177  Accordingly, the court
should find that inducement to infringe copyright is not applicable in
LimeWire and proceed to conduct an analysis under Sony.'
78
The uncertainty created by the Supreme Court's decision in
Grokster, with respect to Sony, will be a challenge for the LimeWire
court. As previously noted, the Court in Grokster did not address the
question presented: "[U]nder what circumstances the distributor of a
product capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of
copyright infringement by third parties.' 79
The court should look to Justice Breyer's concurring opinion for
guidance on Sony. 180 Justice Breyer, in his opinion compared the facts
of Sony to those in Grokster and determined that Sony was applied
appropriately by the Ninth Circuit.' 8 1 Justice Breyer artfully noted that
while Grokster involved sharing music through a peer-to-peer network,
other lawful uses of peer-to-peer file sharing would suffer from a narrow
interpretation of Sony.'8 2  Breyer's opinion envisioned a new
marketplace in which lawful uses of peer-to-peer software will flourish
and develop with a finding consistent with the Ninth Circuit's
application of Sony to Grokster.'8 3  In reviewing LimeWire in this
context, the court cannot hold and should not hold LimeWire liable for
contributory infringement. A holding in favor of LimeWire will force
the music industry and technology developers to lobby Congress for
guidance on when Sony is applicable and what factors are determinative
for inducement1 4 Congress, the appropriate body, will be able to hold
hearings to balance the interest of the copyright holder and the
developers of technology.
176. Compare MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 545 U.S. 913, 921-22 (2005)
with Arista Records LLC, et al. v. LimeWire, No. 06-CV. 5936 (S.D.N.Y. filed August 4, 2006).
177. Id.
178. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
179. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 918.
180. There were two concurring opinions in Grokster. Justice Breyer's concurring opinion
looks to the application of the Sony test to Grokster while, the opinion of Justice Ginsburg
complains about the evidence that the Ninth Circuit relied on in Grokster and spends pages
discussing the primary purpose without reviewing Sony. Id. at 941-65.
181. See generally id. at 913.
182. Id. at 950.
183. Id. at 960.
184. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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While lobbying for clarity on the secondary liability standards for
copyright infringement will prove to be a most valuable tool for
developers and their lawyers, legislation similar to the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 ("AHRA") 185 is undoubtedly the best solution to
end the plethora of infringement lawsuits. The AHRA established a
royalty tax of up to $8 per new digital recording machine and 3% of the
price of all digital audiotapes and discs that are collectable from the
manufacturers of digital devices. 8 6  This royalty is subsequently
distributed to the copyright owners who, in consideration of payment of
the tax, waive all claims of copyright infringement against consumers
using the technology. 8 7 Legislation that would provide a similar royalty
tax on technology that enables copying via the Internet would strike the
appropriate balance between the interest of the copyright owner, the
developer of the technology and the consumer. Whether Congress
chooses to amend the AHRA s88 or to introduce new legislation, a royalty
tax based upon the revenues received by the technology developer and
waiver of all claims of direct infringement by the end users of such
technology is the appropriate remedy to the peer-to-peer technology
conundrum.
It is clear, from the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster, that
litigation is not the answer to resolve the dilemma faced by the
developer of technology.18 9 The courts are not equipped to conduct the
delicate balance that considers both parties. Bright line rules along with
a measurable tax on the revenues of such technology will ultimately
balance the copyright holder's interest against that of the developer of
technology. Clearly, there is a marketplace for peer-to-peer technology
and it is arguable that without such technology the creation of music
download would not have evolved. Congress, the music industry and
technology developers should look to previous successful resolutions in
balancing the competing interests of copyright holders and technology
developers, and look to the AHRA to create legislation that will support
the development of new technology while continuing to provide the
incentive for artists to create.
185. 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1990).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id
189. MGM Studios Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al., 545 U.S. 913, 914-17, 921-22 (2005).
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